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AN EVOLVING WORKFORCE, AN ADAPTING
LAW: TITLE VII’S COVERAGE OF GENDER
IDENTITY AND CRIMINAL HISTORY
SANDRA PULLMAN†
INTRODUCTION
In the half-century since the passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, workplace protections under the statute have expanded
in a variety of ways. Legal theories that were once considered
novel have increasingly been accepted in federal courts across the
country, extending coverage to more employees than ever before.
Yet, an analysis of these developing issues also exposes the
limitations of federal antidiscrimination law. Below, this Article
examines the ways that Title VII has been applied to two
particularly vulnerable groups: transgender individuals and
individuals with criminal records.
I.

DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF GENDER IDENTITY
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Sandra Pullman is an Assistant Attorney General in the Civil Rights Bureau
of the New York State Attorney General’s Office, an adjunct clinical professor at
Brooklyn Law School, and a graduate of Harvard Law School.
1
JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 3 (2011), available at
http://www.thetaskforce.org/static_html/downloads/reports/reports/ntds_full.pdf.
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Although there have been significant victories for lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender (“LGBT”) rights in recent years,
there is no nationwide protection from employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender
identity. Transgender workers in particular face high rates of
discrimination: Nearly half of transgender employees in a 2011
survey reported being fired, not hired, or denied promotions
based on their gender identities.1 Indeed, Vice President Joe
Biden has observed that transgender discrimination is “the civil
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rights issue of our time.”2 While bills to add sexual orientation
and gender identity to federal law have languished in Congress,
some courts and agencies have interpreted Title VII, in some
cases, to provide coverage for transgender workers under sex
stereotyping and other legal theories. Elsewhere, advocates
continue to rely on more expansive state and local civil rights
laws to vindicate their clients’ rights.
A.

Lack of Coverage

On its face, Title VII does not include gender identity as a
protected category.3
As a result, Title VII was originally
interpreted to exclude coverage for transgender individuals.4 In
1977, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
rejected a claim by a transgender worker based on Title VII’s
prohibition on sex discrimination, asserting that “Congress had
only the traditional notions of ‘sex’ in mind.”5 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit later agreed that
“Congress has not shown an intention to protect transsexuals,”
and held that “discrimination based on one’s transsexualism does
not fall within the protective purview of the Act.”6 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit subsequently
concluded, “[A] prohibition against discrimination based on an
individual’s sex is not synonymous with a prohibition against
discrimination based on an individual’s sexual identity disorder
or discontent with the sex into which they were born.”7
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2
Jennifer Bendery, Joe Biden: Transgender Discrimination Is ‘The Civil Rights
Issue of Our Time,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 30, 2012, 11:16 PM), http://www.huffing
tonpost.com/2012/10/30/joe-biden-transgender-rights_n_2047275.html (last updated
Oct. 31, 2012, 2:17 PM) (internal quotation marks omitted).
3
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).
4
See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v.
Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen
& Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662–63 (9th Cir. 1977).
5
Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662–63.
6
Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750.
7
Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085.
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Sex Stereotyping

Meanwhile, beginning in the late 1980s, courts began
interpreting the statute’s prohibition of sex discrimination more
expansively. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,8 the United States
Supreme Court found a company liable for refusing to promote a
female accountant because she did not act sufficiently feminine.9
The Court explained:
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the
stereotype associated with their group, for “[i]n forbidding
employers to discriminate against individuals because of their
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex
stereotypes.”10

8
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490 U.S. 228 (1989).
Id. at 272.
10
Id. at 251 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
11
523 U.S. 75 (1998).
12
Id. at 79.
13
Id.
14
204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
15
Id. at 1192.
9
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Nearly a decade later, the Supreme Court permitted a claim
of same-sex sexual harassment to proceed under Title VII. In
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,11 the Court noted,
“male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was
assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with
when it enacted Title VII.”12 However, “statutory prohibitions
often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable
evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than
the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are
governed.”13
Following
this
expansive
approach
to
statutory
interpretation, the Ninth Circuit later applied the sexstereotyping theory to cover a transgender prison guard under
the Gender Motivated Violence Act (“GMVA”). In Schwenk v.
Hartford,14 the plaintiff sued a state prison guard and several
prison officials for an attempted rape.15 Relying on Title VII
jurisprudence, the court held that the rulings had been rendered
moot by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Price Waterhouse, which
excluded
transgender
persons
from
protection
under
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Id. at 1201–02.
See id.
18
378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
19
Id. at 572, 575.
20
Id. at 568.
21
Id. at 574.
22
401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005).
23
Id. at 738.
24
Id. at 737.
25
See, e.g., Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 325 F. App’x 492, 493 (9th
Cir. 2009); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874–75 (9th Cir. 2001);
Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 262–64 (3d Cir. 2001); Higgins
v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999); Doe v. City
of Belleville, Ill., 119 F.3d 563, 580–81 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated on other grounds, 523
U.S. 1001 (1998); EEOC v. Grief Bros. Corp., No. 02-CV-468S, 2004 WL 2202641, at
17

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 136 Side B

antidiscrimination law.16 Therefore, a transgender plaintiff could
state a Title VII claim for discrimination based on the failure to
act in accordance with sex stereotypes.17
In 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit followed suit in Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio,18 finding
that a transgender woman had successfully pleaded a Title VII
sex discrimination claim, since “[s]ex stereotyping based on a
person’s gender non-conforming behavior is impermissible
discrimination, irrespective of the cause of that behavior.”19 In
Smith, the plaintiff was a lieutenant with the Salem Fire
Department who was suspended after informing her supervisor
that she intended to transition from male to female.20 The court
found that the plaintiff stated a claim for relief, explaining that
just as discrimination against women for not wearing dresses or
makeup is discrimination on the basis of sex, “employers who
discriminate against men because they do wear dresses and
makeup, or otherwise act femininely, are also engaging in sex
discrimination, because the discrimination would not occur but
for the victim’s sex.”21 A year later in Barnes v. City of
Cincinnati,22 the Sixth Circuit upheld a Title VII claim brought
by a transgender police officer against the city where she alleged
that she was denied a promotion because her supervisors thought
she was not masculine enough.23 Citing Smith, the court held
that Barnes had made out a claim for discrimination based on
her failure to conform to sex stereotypes.24 In recent years,
several other courts have recognized the viability of Title VII
claims for sex stereotyping brought by gender nonconforming
individuals.25
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Gender Identity Discrimination as Sex Discrimination

More recently, courts have held that Title VII’s prohibition
on sex discrimination encompasses discrimination against those
who have transitioned from one sex to another. For example, a
federal court in the District of Columbia reasoned that just as
“[d]iscrimination ‘because of religion’ easily encompasses
discrimination because of a change of religion,” discrimination
because of sex should also include discrimination because of a
change in sex.26 The court accepted the petitioner’s argument
that “discrimination on the basis of gender identity is sex
discrimination.”27 In 2012, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC” or “Commission”) similarly held that
discrimination based on gender identity, change of sex, and
transgender status, is discrimination on the basis of sex,
prohibited by Title VII.28
Such arguments have not been as persuasive with regard to
sexual orientation discrimination; courts have typically rejected
allegations that Title VII’s prohibition on sex stereotyping
extends to employees’ sexual preferences or same-sex
relationships.29 Yet just last year, a federal court in D.C. found
that a plaintiff had asserted a valid Title VII claim:
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*15 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004); Tronetti v. TLC HealthNet Lakeshore Hosp., No. 03CV-0375E(SC), 2003 WL 22757935, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2003).
26
Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 306–07 (D.D.C. 2008) (emphasis
omitted).
27
Id. at 306.
28
EEOC Decision No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *1 (Apr. 20, 2012).
29
See, e.g., Creed v. Family Express Corp., No. 3:06-CV-465RM, 2009 WL
35237, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 5, 2009) (holding that harassment based on sexual
preference is not actionable under Title VII); Sweet v. Mulberry Lutheran Home, No.
IP02-0320-C-H/K, 2003 WL 21525058, at *3 (S.D. Ind. June 17, 2003) (holding that
intent to change sex is not actionable under Title VII).
30
Terveer v. Billington, 34 F. Supp. 3d 100, 116 (D.D.C. 2014) (citations
omitted).
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Here, Plaintiff has alleged that he is “a homosexual male whose
sexual orientation is not consistent with the Defendant’s
perception of acceptable gender roles,” that his “status as a
homosexual male did not conform to the Defendant’s gender
stereotypes associated with men . . . ” and that “his orientation
as homosexual had removed him from [his employer’s]
preconceived definition of male.”30
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D. Title VII Limitations
Not all jurisdictions have adopted the above reasoning, and
indeed, some courts continue to reject Title VII claims brought by
transgender individuals because they are not part of an explicitly
protected category.31 Others draw a line between allowing sexstereotyping claims by transgender plaintiffs and statutory
protection for transgender workers. For example, a federal court
in Georgia allowed a claim to proceed where the plaintiff alleged
that she was fired because her “desire to present as a woman at
work did not comport with [her employer’s] stereotype of how a
biological male should dress or behave.”32
The court
distinguished this claim from one based on that plaintiff’s gender
transition, which would not have been actionable. The court
observed, “While transsexuals are not members of a protected
class based on sex, those who do not conform to gender
stereotypes are members of a protected class based on sex.”33
However, this distinction falls apart when one considers that
transgender individuals, by definition, do not conform to
stereotypes associated with their gender assigned at birth.
E.

State and Local Law
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31
See, e.g., Creed, 2009 WL 35237, at *10 (stating that “Title VII’s prohibition
on sex discrimination doesn’t extend so far” as to cover discrimination on the basis of
transgender status); Mulberry Lutheran Home, 2003 WL 21525058, at *3 (holding
that the plaintiff’s “intent to change his sex does not support a claim of sex
discrimination under Title VII because that intended behavior did not place him
within the class of persons protected under Title VII from discrimination based on
sex”).
32
Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2010).
33
Id. at 1300.
34
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 291 (McKinney 2015).
35
Richards v. U.S. Tennis Ass’n, 93 Misc. 2d 713, 722, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267, 273
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1977).
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In New York, state and local law provide additional
protections for LGBT workers, helping to fill in the gaps of Title
VII’s coverage. On the state level, the New York State Human
Rights Law protects individuals from discrimination based on
sexual orientation, although it lacks explicit coverage for
discrimination on the basis of gender identity.34 Nonetheless, it
has been interpreted broadly to include transgender persons as a
protected group as far back as 1977.35 Later courts have also
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held that the state antidiscrimination law covers transgender
individuals though the legislature has not yet amended its
definition of “sex” to explicitly say so.36
The protections under New York City law are even stronger.
In 2002, New York City amended its City Human Rights Law to
redefine “gender.” The definition now includes not only actual or
perceived sex, but also “a person’s gender identity, self-image,
appearance, behavior or expression, whether or not that gender
identity, self-image, appearance, behavior or expression is
different from that traditionally associated with the legal sex
assigned to that person at birth.”37
However, some aspects of these laws still fail to provide the
comprehensive remedies contained in Title VII. The New York
State Human Rights Law does not provide attorney fees,38 which
limits incentives for private counsel to take such cases on
contingency. Additionally, the New York City Human Rights
Law has its limits with regard to public employees.39 For
example, in Jattan v. Queens College of City University of New
York,40 the court dismissed the plaintiff’s City Human Rights
claim against Queens College, an instrumentality of New York
State, holding that “the City of New York does not have the
power to waive the State’s sovereign immunity.”41
II. DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF CRIMINAL HISTORY
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36
See Rentos v. Oce-Office Sys., No. 95 CIV. 7908 LAP, 1996 WL 737215, at *8–
9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 1996); Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 164 Misc. 2d 547, 554–56,
626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 395–96 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1995). See generally Buffong v. Castle
on the Hudson, 12 Misc. 3d 1193(A), 824 N.Y.S.2d 752 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Cnty.
2005).
37
NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(23) (N.Y. Leg. Publ’g Co. 2015).
38
E.g., N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ. v. Sears, 83 A.D.2d 959, 960, 443 N.Y.S.2d 23, 25 (2d
Dep’t 1981).
39
See Jattan v. Queens Coll. of City Univ. of N.Y., 64 A.D.3d 540, 541–42, 883
N.Y.S.2d 110, 112 (2d Dep’t 2009).
40
64 A.D.3d 540, 883 N.Y.S.2d 110.
41
Id. at 542, 883 N.Y.S.2d at 112.
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As with gender identity, criminal history is not a protected
category under federal antidiscrimination law. Yet individuals
with criminal records also face significant barriers to obtaining
and maintaining viable employment, especially along racial lines,
and Title VII has accordingly been used to provide some
protection from irrational discrimination on this basis.
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A growing number of ex-offenders are encountering obstacles
to employment opportunities. After all, the United States
incarcerates a larger percentage of its population than any
country in the world.42 If this trend continues, approximately
6.6% of all persons born in this country in 2001 will serve time in
prison during their lifetimes.43 These high levels of incarceration
are further plagued by stark racial disparities as African
Americans and Hispanics are incarcerated at a rate that is two to
three times their proportion of the general population.44 One in
seventeen white men is expected to serve time in prison during
his lifetime; this rate rises to one in six for Hispanic men and to
one in three for African-American men.45
Upon release from prison, there are continuing collateral
consequences of a criminal record, particularly in employment.
Studies have found that seventy-five percent of employers now
screen their candidates by asking them to divulge their criminal
history during the hiring process.46 Such barriers to employment
not only deprive ex-offenders of a second chance and frustrate the
criminal justice goals of rehabilitation and reintegration into
society, but they also diminish public safety, since job instability
is associated with higher crime and increased recidivism.47
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42
See Roy Walmsley, World Prison Population List (Tenth Edition), INT’L
CENTRE FOR PRISON STUD., 2013, at 2–6, available at http://www.prisonstudies.org/
sites/default/files/resources/downloads/wppl_10.pdf (noting the United States prison
population rate of 716 per 100,000 people is the highest in the world).
43
THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT:
PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974–2001, at 1 (2003),
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/piusp01.pdf.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
EMPLOYEESCREENIQ, BACKGROUND SCREENING TRENDS & PRACTICES:
RESULTS OF EMPLOYEESCREENIQ’S 6TH ANNUAL SURVEY OF U.S.-BASED EMPLOYERS
(Apr. 2015), available at http://content.employeescreen.com/hubfs/ESIQ_2015_sur
vey_final2.pdf?t=1446555272215.
47
See THELTON E. HENDERSON CENTER FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE AT BERKELEY LAW,
A HIGHER HURDLE: BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT FOR FORMERLY INCARCERATED
WOMEN 7 (2008), available at http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=1001&context=werc (noting that as unemployment increases,
crime increases and as wages go up, crime is reduced); see also NEW YORK CITY BAR
ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE PREVIOUSLY
INCARCERATED, LEGAL EMPLOYERS TAKING THE LEAD: ENHANCING EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE PREVIOUSLY INCARCERATED 35 (2008), available at
http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/Task_Force_Report08.pdf
(“Providing
secure
employment with prospects for advancement to the formerly incarcerated will
reduce recidivism, reduce the costs of maintaining a huge prison population (thereby
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Furthermore, racial inequities persist in these hiring practices:
Black applicants with criminal records are hired at lower rates
than whites with the same criminal history, and blacks without
any criminal conviction are hired at rates similar to or even
lower than whites with convictions.48
Two main causes of action are available to employees to
challenge employers’ bans on hiring applicants with criminal
records. Under federal law, there is a viable cause of action
based on the disproportionate racial impact of the practice.
Under state law, applicants for employment are entitled to an
individualized consideration of their criminal records, regardless
of race.
A.

Disparate Impact Analysis

C M
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lowering taxes or reducing the pressure to raise them), strengthen family ties, and
enhance public safety—all of which are important social objectives.”).
48
Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 958 fig.6
(2003).
49
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012).
50
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
51
Id. at 430.
52
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
53
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 442 (1982) (holding a “bottom line” racial
balance in the workforce “does not preclude . . . employees from establishing a prima
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Title VII prohibits discrimination by employers based on
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.49 In 1971, the
Supreme Court interpreted Title VII to proscribe not only “overt
discrimination[,] but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation.”50
Therefore, even “practices,
procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in
terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’
the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.”51
Under this framework, a plaintiff must first establish a
prima facie case of disparate impact.52 In this context, national
data can be used to support a finding that criminal record
exclusions have a disparate impact based on race and national
origin. Applicant flow information, workforce data, criminal
history background check data, demographic availability
statistics, incarceration and conviction data, and relevant labor
market statistics can all be used to create a prima facie showing
of disparate impact. The issue is not whether the workforce is
racially balanced,53 but rather whether policy or practice deprives
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a disproportionate number of Title VII protected individuals from
employment opportunities.54 Additionally, in assessing applicant
data, a lack of applicants may also be considered probative
because an employer’s “application process might itself not
adequately reflect the actual potential applicant pool, since
otherwise qualified people might be discouraged from applying”
because of a discriminatory policy or practice.55
If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disparate
impact, the second step of the analysis looks for
employer-produced evidence that the discriminatory policy is job
related and consistent with business necessity.56 In Griggs v.
Duke Power Co.,57 the Court focused on the lack of a nexus
between the hiring requirements and the successful performance
of the job.58 The Court held that the job requirement must “bear
a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs
for which it was used” and “must measure the person for the job
and not the person in the abstract.”59
Decisions by the Eighth Circuit and Third Circuit clarify the
business necessity analysis in the context of criminal history
bans. In 1975, in Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.,60 the
Eighth Circuit found that Title VII prohibited an employer from
“follow[ing] the policy of disqualifying for employment any
applicant with a conviction for any crime other than a minor
traffic offense.”61
The Green panel identified three factors
(“Green factors”) that were relevant in the analysis of whether

04/08/2016 13:04:55
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facie case” of disparate impact, “nor does it provide [an] employer with a defense to
such a case” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
54
Id. at 453–54.
55
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977).
56
Id. at 331.
57
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
58
Id. at 431 (“The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice
which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance,
the practice is prohibited.”); see also Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331 n.14 (interpreting
Griggs to require a showing that the “discriminatory employment practice . . . [is]
necessary to safe and efficient job performance to survive a Title VII challenge”);
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (“[D]iscriminatory tests are
impermissible unless shown, by professionally acceptable methods, to be ‘predictive
of or significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior which
comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being
evaluated.’ ” (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (2015))).
59
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431, 436.
60
523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).
61
Id. at 1293, 1298–99.
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62
Id. at 1297 (finding that the Iowa provision in question suffered from such
narrowing criteria).
63
479 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2007).
64
Id. at 235–36.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 235.
67
Id. at 245.
68
Id. at 247.
69
Id. at 243, 245.
70
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (2012); see
also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 998 (1988).
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the exclusion was job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity: (1) the nature and gravity of
the offense or conduct, (2) the time that has passed since the
offense or conduct or the completion of the sentence, and (3) the
nature of the job held or sought.62
The Third Circuit, in El v. Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority,63 further developed the Green factors.
The plaintiff, Douglas El, after being rejected for the job as a
paratransit driver, challenged Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority’s (“SEPTA”) policy of excluding
everyone convicted of a violent offense.64 SEPTA terminated El
after SEPTA learned of his conviction of second-degree murder
forty years prior when El was fifteen.65 Despite “reservations
about [the] policy in the abstract,” the Third Circuit affirmed the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of SEPTA.66
Title VII, according to the court, requires “the policy under
review [to] accurately distinguish between applicants that pose
an unacceptable level of risk and those that do not.”67 Although
it affirmed the grant of summary judgment, the court noted that
if El had “hired an expert who testified that there is time at
which a former criminal is no longer any more likely to recidivate
than the average person, then there would be a factual question
for the jury to resolve.”68 The Third Circuit distinguished the
employer’s policy in El from the employer’s policy in Green by
emphasizing the fact that paratransit drivers have access to
“vulnerable members of society.”69
Finally, even if an employer demonstrates that its policy is
job related for the position in question and is consistent with
business necessity, the plaintiff may still prevail by showing that
the employer’s legitimate goals can be served by a less
discriminatory “alternative employment practice.”70
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See generally U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE NO. 915.002, CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN
EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (2012),
2012 WL 1499883.
72
Id. at *12.
73
See id. at *2.
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Id. at *17.
75
Id.
76
See id. at *16.
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In April 2012, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission published EEOC Enforcement Guidance 915.002
(“Guidance”) regarding employers’ use of criminal records in
employment screening.71 The Commission interpreted Title VII
to call for a “fact-based analysis to determine if an exclusionary
policy or practice is job related and consistent with business
necessity.”72
The Commission provided two ways by which to defend a
disparate impact claim against a policy of exclusion based on
criminal history: (1) validation studies of the policy pursuant to
federal regulations or (2) consideration of at least the three Green
factors, plus an individualized assessment of applicants.73 An
individualized assessment should generally include three
features. The employer should: (1) inform the applicant that he
may be excluded because of past criminal conduct, (2) provide an
opportunity to the individual to demonstrate that the exclusion
does not properly apply to him, and (3) consider whether the
individual’s additional information shows that the policy as
applied is not job related and consistent with business
necessity.74
While noting that Title VII does not require an
individualized assessment, the EEOC identifies types of
additional information to consider, including the age of the
applicant at the time of the offense, evidence of rehabilitation,
and the facts and circumstances of the offense.75
Generally, the EEOC advises employers to eliminate blanket
exclusions based simply on the existence of a criminal record.76
The Commission recommends that an employer develop a
“narrowly tailored written policy and procedure” for screening
applicants and employees in a way that identifies essential job
requirements, lists the specific offenses that may demonstrate
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unfitness for performing such jobs, and identifies the duration of
the exclusions.77 The EEOC further notes that justifications for
the policy and procedures should also be recorded.78
C.

State Law

Meanwhile, New York Correction Law Article 23-A, passed
in 1976, provides comprehensive coverage for all job applicants
with a criminal history requiring an individualized analysis and
obviating the need for plaintiffs to provide statistical analysis of
racial impact.79 Under article 23-A, an employer may not deny or
terminate employment on the basis of prior criminal convictions,
except under two narrowly defined circumstances:
(1) [T]here is a direct relationship between one or more of the
previous criminal offenses and the specific license or
employment sought or held by the individual; or (2) the issuance
or continuation of the license or the granting or continuation of
the employment would involve an unreasonable risk to property
or to the safety or welfare of specific individuals or the general
public.80

Furthermore, article 23-A codifies the Green factors and
additional relevant information which employers must consider:

77

79
80
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Id. at *23.
Id.
See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 750–755 (McKinney 2015).
Id. § 752.
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78
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(a) The public policy of this state, as expressed in this act, to
encourage the licensure and employment of persons previously
convicted of one or more criminal offenses.
(b) The specific duties and responsibilities necessarily related to
the license or employment sought or held by the person.
(c) The bearing, if any, the criminal offense or offenses for which
the person was previously convicted will have on his fitness or
ability to perform one or more such duties or responsibilities.
(d) The time which has elapsed since the occurrence of the
criminal offense or offenses.
(e) The age of the person at the time of occurrence of the
criminal offense or offenses.
(f) The seriousness of the offense or offenses.
(g) Any information produced by the person, or produced on his
behalf, in regard to his rehabilitation and good conduct.
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(h) The legitimate interest of the public agency or private
employer in protecting property, and the safety and welfare of
specific individuals or the general public.81

Article 23-A applies to all governmental and private employers
operating in New York State that employ ten or more
individuals.82
III. CONCLUSION
Federal courts have taken laudable steps toward addressing
inequality in the workplace by interpreting Title VII to provide
coverage for disadvantaged groups that fall outside the
statutorily proscribed categories. Yet given the limits on the law,
state and local antidiscrimination statutes continue to play a role
in helping employees vindicate their civil rights. The examples of
transgender employees and job applicants with criminal records
show that federal antidiscrimination law has in some ways
adapted to address current civil rights issues, but it still has a
long way to go.
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